


In one argument domestic investment demand weakened due to a pause or slowdown in British productivity growth – a productivity climacteric – and, because Britons continued to save despite slowing domestic investment demand, funds moved abroad by default. Others have argued that the capital export was a result of weaknesses in the domestic British economy. To some observers the immense capital export went abroad because of the high profitability of railroad and other social overhead investments in the emerging primary product economies of North America, South America and Australasia. Never before or since has one nation committed so much of its national income and savings to capital formation abroad. Paish (1914), estimating the value of the stock of British overseas assets just before the First World War, net of repatriations and foreign sales, suggested that the total stock at the end of 1913 was not less than £4,000 million (see also Platt 1986 Kennedy 1987b Feinstein 1990b). As a result of these annual flows, net overseas assets grew from around 7 per cent of the stock of net national wealth in 1850 to around 14 per cent in 1870 and then to around 32 per cent in 1913. Foreign investment took increasingly varied forms over the course of the twentieth century. Rising in the 1850s and 1860s, the flow of net foreign investment averaged about a third of the nation’s annual accumulations from 1870 to 1914. The overwhelming 1896 victory of William McKinleythe Republican party’s Napoleon of Protectionmarked the beginning of substantial expansion of U.S. As the global COVID-19 pandemic continues to evolve, the Government of Canada is taking strong and quick action to protect the health and safety of all Canadians and to stabilize our economy. Great Britain’s immense capital export is among the most important historical phenomena of the period between 18.
